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Abstract
The 2016 presidential election was a jarring event for polling in the United
States. Preelection polls fueled high-profile predictions that Hillary Clinton’s
likelihood of winning the presidency was about 90 percent, with estimates ranging from 71 to over 99 percent. When Donald Trump was declared the winner of
the presidency, there was a widespread perception that the polls failed. But did
the polls fail? And if so, why? Those are among the central questions addressed
by an American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) ad hoc committee. This paper presents the committee’s analysis of the performance of preelection polls in 2016, how that performance compares to polling in prior elections, and the extent to which performance varied by poll design. In addition, the
committee examined several theories as to why many polls, particularly in the
Upper Midwest, underestimated support for Trump. The explanations for which
the most evidence exists are a late swing in vote preference toward Trump and
a pervasive failure to adjust for overrepresentation of college graduates (who
favored Clinton). In addition, there is clear evidence that voter turnout changed
from 2012 to 2016 in ways that favored Trump, though there is only mixed evidence that misspecified likely voter models were a major cause of the systematic
polling error. Finally, there is little evidence that socially desirable (Shy Trump)
responding was an important contributor to poll error.

Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 presidential election came as a
shock to pollsters, political analysts, reporters, and pundits, including
those inside Trump’s own campaign (Jacobs and House 2016). Leading
up to the election, three types of information widely discussed in the
news media indicated that Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton was
likely to win. First, polling data showed Clinton consistently leading
the national popular vote, which is usually predictive of the winner
(Erikson and Wlezien 2012), and leading, if narrowly, in Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin—states that had voted Democratic for
president six elections running. Second, early voting patterns in key
states, particularly in Florida and North Carolina, were described in
high-profile news stories as favorable for Clinton (Silver 2017a). Third,
election forecasts from highly trained academics and data journalists
declared that Clinton’s probability of winning was about 90 percent,
with estimates ranging from 71 to over 99 percent (Katz 2016).
The day after the election, there was a palpable mix of surprise and
outrage directed toward the polling community, as many felt that the
industry had seriously misled the country about who would win (e.g.,
Byers 2016; Cillizza 2016; Easley 2016; Shepard 2016). The unexpected
US outcome added to concerns about polling raised by errors in the
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2014 referendum on Scottish independence, the 2015 UK general election, and the 2016 British referendum on European Union membership (Barnes 2016).
In the weeks after the 2016 US election, states certified their vote
totals and researchers began assessing what happened with the polls.
It became clear that a confluence of factors made the collective polling miss seem worse than it actually was, at least in some respects.
The winner of the popular vote (Clinton) was different than the winner of the Electoral College (Trump). While such a divided result is
not without precedent, the full arc of US history suggests it is highly
unlikely. With respect to polling, preelection estimates pointed to an
Electoral College contest that was less certain than interpretations in
the news media suggested (Trende 2016; Silver 2017b). Eight states
with more than a third of the electoral votes needed to win the presidency had polls showing a lead of three points or less (Trende 2016).
Trende noted that his organization’s battleground-state poll averages
had Clinton leading by a very slim margin in the Electoral College (272
to 266), putting Trump one state away from winning the election. Relatedly, the elections in the three Upper Midwest states that broke unexpectedly for Trump (Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin) were
extremely close. More than 13.8 million people voted for president
in those states, and Trump’s combined margin of victory was 77,744
votes (0.56 percent). Even the most rigorously designed polls cannot
reliably indicate the winner in contests with such razor-thin margins.
Even with these caveats about the election, a number of important
questions surrounding polling remained. There was a systematic underestimation of support for Trump in state-level and, to a lesser extent, national polls. The causes of that pattern were not clear but potentially important for avoiding bias in future polls. Also, different
types of polls (e.g., online versus live telephone) seemed to be producing somewhat different estimates. This raised questions about whether
some types of polls were more accurate and why. More broadly, how
did the performance of 2016 preelection polls compare to those of
prior elections?
These questions became the central foci for an ad hoc committee
commissioned by the American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) in the spring of 2016. The committee was tasked
with summarizing the accuracy of 2016 preelection polling, reviewing
variation by different poll methodologies, and assessing performance
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through a historical lens. After the election, the committee decided to
also investigate why polls, particularly in the Upper Midwest, underestimated support for Trump.
The next section presents several of the main theories for why
many polls underestimated Trump’s support. This is followed by a discussion of the data and key metrics the committee used to perform its
analyses. Subsequent sections of the paper present analyses motivated
by the research questions posed here. The paper concludes with a discussion of the main findings and implications for the field.

Theories about Why Polls Underestimated Support for Trump
A number of theories were put forward as to why many polls missed
in 2016.1
Nonresponse Bias and Deficient Weighting
Most preelection polls have single-digit response rates or feature an
opt-in sample for which a response rate cannot be computed (Callegaro and DiSogra 2008; AAPOR 2016). While the link between low response rates and bias is not particularly strong (e.g., Merkle and Edelman 2002; Groves and Peytcheva 2008; Pew Research Center 2012,
2017a), such low rates do carry an increased risk of bias (e.g., Burden
2000). Of particular note, adults with weaker partisan strength (e.g.,
Keeter et al. 2006), lower educational levels (Battaglia, Frankel, and
Link 2008; Chang and Krosnick 2009; Link et al. 2008; Pew Research
Center 2012, 2017a), and anti-government views (U.S. Census Bureau
2015) are less likely to take part in surveys. Given the anti-elite themes
of the Trump campaign, Trump voters may have been less likely than
other voters to accept survey requests. If survey response was correlated with presidential vote and some factor not accounted for in the
weighting, then a deficient weighting protocol could be one explanation for the polling errors.
1. The original committee report (AAPOR 2017) also discussed ballot-order effects. That discussion has been dropped in this paper because there was not strong evidence that such
effects were a major contributor to polling errors in 2016. There remains an important debate about the possibility that ballot order affected the outcome of the presidential race in
several states, including Michigan, Wisconsin, and Florida.
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Late Deciding
The notion that preelection polls fielded closer to Election Day tend
to be more predictive of the election outcome than equally rigorous
polls conducted farther out has been well documented for some time
(e.g., Crespi 1988; Traugott 2001; Erikson and Wlezien 2012). The effect of late changes in voters’ decisions can be particularly large in
elections with major campaign-related events very close to Election
Day (AAPOR 2009). Both Trump and Clinton had historically poor favorability ratings (Collins 2016; Yourish 2016). Unhappy with their
options, some voters may have waited until the final week or so before deciding. Moreover, late deciders, being less anchored politically,
tend to be more influenced by campaign events than voters deciding
earlier (Fournier et al. 2004).
Misspecified Likely Voter Models
Constructing an accurate likely voter model is a tall order for even the
most seasoned pollsters (Erikson, Panagopoulos, and Wlezien 2004).
When turnout patterns diverge from recent elections, historical data
can be unhelpful or even misleading. Voter turnout in 2016 differed
from that in 2012 in ways that advantaged Trump and disadvantaged
Clinton. Nationally, turnout among African Americans, the group most
supportive of Clinton, dropped seven percentage points while turnout
among Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites changed little, according
to the Current Population Survey (CPS) Voting and Registration Supplement (File 2017). Furthermore, analysis by Fraga and colleagues
(2017) indicates that the decline in African American turnout was
sharpest in states such as Wisconsin and Michigan, which determined
the outcome of the election. If pollsters designed their likely voter
models around the assumption that 2016 turnout patterns would be
similar to 2012, this could have led to underestimation of support for
Republicans, including Trump. Such model misspecification could have
been exacerbated by skews in the 2012 national exit poll (a popular
source for turnout data) overstating turnout among young and nonwhite voters (McDonald 2007; Cohn 2016).
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The “Shy Trump” Hypothesis (Reporting Error)
Controversy surrounding Trump’s candidacy raised the possibility that
some Trump voters may not have been willing to disclose their support for him in surveys. If a sizable share of Trump voters were reluctant to disclose their support for him, that could explain the systematic underestimation of Trump support in polls (e.g., Enns, Lagodny,
and Schuldt 2017). Concern about the possibility of systematic misreporting of vote intention for or against a controversial candidate
dates back decades. Studies examining this issue have tended to focus
on elections in which either candidate race (Citrin, Green, and Sears
1990; Finkel, Guterbock, and Borg 1991; Traugott and Price 1992; Hopkins 2009) or gender (Hopkins 2009; Stout and Kline 2011) was a potential factor in polling error. In the 2016 presidential election, both
race and gender were highly salient. Clinton was the first female major-party presidential nominee, and although both candidates were
white, Trump’s record on racially charged issues (e.g., housing discrimination, the Central Park Five, birtherism) and open support from
white supremacists put race in the forefront of the campaign. However, a recent study suggests that the risk to polls from respondents
intentionally misreporting vote choice has diminished considerably
or disappeared entirely (Hopkins 2009).

Data and Methods
The committee used two types of data to evaluate the performance
of polls and test the hypotheses listed above: respondent-level microdata sets and poll-level datasets. Given the large number of pollsters
active during the election and the reality that all pollsters structure
their microdata sets differently, the committee was selective in asking
for microdata. ABC News/Washington Post, CNN, Marquette University, Michigan State University, Monmouth University, Pew Research
Center, SurveyMonkey, USC/LA Times, and YouGov all provided microdata to the committee (Supplement Appendix A).
Poll-level datasets were compiled from FiveThirtyEight (via
GitHub), HuffPollster, and RealClearPolitics. Those sources provide a
few pieces of design information about each poll (e.g., pollster name,
field dates, sample size, target population, and mode) in addition to

Kennedy et al. in Public Opinion Quarterly 82 (2018)

7

the horserace estimates. For 2016 polls conducted close to Election
Day, the committee supplemented those data with information about
weighting, sample source, and the ratio of landline to cell phone interviews, where applicable. Adding these variables was done manually through searches of individual press releases, news stories, methodology reports, and pollster websites.
When design information about a poll was missing or unclear, the
committee contacted individual pollsters to obtain the information. In
all, the committee reached out to 59 different polling organizations,
and 35 responded with at least partial information. Those who responded were generous with their time and information. Generally,
noncooperation with the committee’s requests did not have a noticeable impact on the work, with one exception. Nearly all pollsters using interactive voice response (IVR), sometimes called robopolls, did
not respond to our requests. IVR polls represent a substantial share
of the state-level polling conducted in 2016.
The committee selected two metrics to be the primary means of assessing poll performance. The absolute error on the poll margin was
computed as the absolute value of the horserace margin (%Clinton minus %Trump) in the poll minus the same margin in the certified vote.
For example, if a poll showed Clinton leading Trump by one point and
she won by three points, the absolute error would be ABS(1 – 3) = 2.
This statistic is always positive, providing a sense of how much polls
differed from the final vote margin but not indicating whether they
missed more toward one candidate or another. The other key metric
is the signed error on the poll margin, which is computed in the exact
same manner as the absolute error but without taking the absolute
value. When averaging absolute error and signed error across multiple polls, the signed error is always lower than (or equal to) the absolute error, since positive and negative values are averaged together.
The election polling literature offers several alternative metrics (e.g.,
Mosteller et al. 1949; Martin, Traugott, and Kennedy 2005), but the
committee focused on the signed and absolute error on the margin
because they are easily compared to past elections, they reflect how
polls are actually discussed, and they are on a scale that a general audience can understand.
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Analysis of the Performance of 2016 Polls Relative to Previous
Elections
In the aftermath of the general election, many declared 2016 a historically bad year for polling. This first section examines the veracity of
such conclusions by comparing the average error of 2016 preelection
polls to that of polling in previous elections.
National General Election Polls2
As shown in Figure 1, national presidential polls in the 2016 general election were highly accurate by historical standards, resulting in
small errors and correctly indicating that Clinton had a national popular vote lead close to her 2.1 percentage-point margin in the certified vote tallies. Final national polls in 2016 had an average absolute
error of 2.2 percentage points, which is more accurate than 2012 national polls (2.9 points average absolute error) and roughly similar to
polling in 2008 (1.8 points) and 2004 (2.1 points). The level of error
in 2016 was less than half the average error in national polls since the
advent of modern polling 1936 (4.4 points), and also lower than the
average in elections since 1992 (2.7 points).
Examination of the average signed error in 2016 (1.3 percentage
points) confirms that national polls tended to overestimate support
for Clinton. Historically, it is not unusual for a frontrunner like Clinton to perform worse on Election Day than in the final polls (Erikson
and Wlezien 2012). That said, the size and direction of the 2016 error contrasts with 2012, when polls underestimated Barack Obama’s
margin against Republican nominee Mitt Romney by 2.4 points. The
average signed error in 2016 national polls was lower than the typical level of signed error in either party’s direction in presidential elections since 1936 (3.8 points), and is also lower than the 2.0-point average signed error in polls since 1992.
2. This analysis includes polls that had a final field date within 13 days of Election Day (October 26 or later) and a starting date no earlier than October 16. National poll analysis includes only a polling firm’s final estimate to ensure comparability with historical data. Analysis of state-level polls, by contrast, includes all polls completed within the final 13 days,
including multiple surveys from the same firm in the same state. The exclusion of pre-final estimates from national polls results provides a clearer historical comparison to analyses by the National Council on Public Polls, which is the source of data from 1936 to 2012
and includes only final estimates.
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Figure 1. Average error in vote margin in national presidential polls, 1936–2016.
The line represents average absolute error. The bars represent average signed error (gray bars indicate overestimation of Republican vote margin; black bars indicate overestimation of Democratic vote margin). The 2016 figures are based on polls
completed within 13 days of the election. Figures for prior years are from the National Council for Public Polls analysis of final poll estimates, some occurring before the 13-day period.

In recent elections, national polls have not consistently favored Republican or Democratic candidates. In 2016, national and state-level
polls tended to underestimate support for Trump, the Republican nominee. In 2000 and 2012, however, general election polls clearly tended
to underestimate support for the Democratic presidential candidates.
Elections from 1936 to 1980 tended to show larger systematic errors
and variation from election to election, in part due to the small number of national polling firms.
State-Level General Election Polls
Unlike national polls, state-level polls in 2016 did have a historically bad year, at least within the recent history of the past four elections. Analysis of 422 state polls completed at least 13 days before
the 2016 election shows an average absolute error of 5.1 percentage
points and a signed error of 3.0 percentage points in the direction of
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overestimating support for Clinton. In the four prior presidential elections, the average absolute error in state polls ranged from 3.2 to 4.6
(Figure 2).
Both absolute errors and signed errors were smaller in battleground states than in non-battleground states (Supplement Appendix B). The average absolute error for the 206 battleground state polls
was 3.6 points, compared with 6.5 points for the 216 polls in non-battleground states. The polls in non-battleground states underestimated
Trump’s vote margin against Clinton by 3.6 points on average (signed
error); the underestimation of Trump’s standing was 2.3 points in battleground states.
While the absolute errors tended to be lower in the more competitive states, underestimation of support for Trump was substantial
and problematic in several consequential states. Wisconsin polls exhibited the largest average signed error (6.5 points), with polls there

Figure 2. Average error in vote margin in state presidential polls, 2000– 2016. The
line represents average absolute error. The bars represent average signed error (gray
bars indicate overestimation of Republican vote margin; black bars indicate overestimation of Democratic vote margin). Source.— Figures for 2000 to 2012 computed
from data made public by FiveThirtyEight.com.
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Table 1. Performance of presidential primary polls by year

% Polls predicting winner
Average absolute error
Number of polls

2000

2004

2008

2012

2016

99%
7.7
172

100%
7.0
129

79%
7.6
555

64%
8.3
195

86%
9.3
457

showing Clinton ahead by between two and 12 points in the final two
weeks before she narrowly lost the state by less than one point. Similarly, before Clinton lost Pennsylvania and Michigan, polls in those
states showed her with roughly three-point leads on average, which
led to average signed errors of 4.2 and 3.5 points in those respective
states. Underestimation of support for Trump was smaller in Florida,
Arizona, and Georgia, while polls in Colorado and Nevada tended to
overestimate his support.
The Performance of Primary and Caucus Polls
The 2016 presidential primary polls generally performed on par relative to past elections. Table 1 provides a summary. This analysis is
based on all publicly released state-level polls conducted in the final
two weeks before each state’s Republican and Democratic primaries.
This totaled 457 state primary polls, including 212 polls in the Republican primaries and 245 polls in the Democratic primaries. The polls
correctly pointed to the winner in 86 percent of the 78 primaries with
poll data available. The average absolute error across all primary polls
reviewed was 9.3 points, not dramatically different, though slightly
higher than errors in primary polls from recent elections. Supplement Appendix C provides additional analysis of the performance of
primary and caucus polls.

Differences in Poll Accuracy by Survey Design
One limitation of aggregate analysis of polling errors is that it glosses
over potentially important variation in performance by poll design.
Given the diversity of designs currently in use, evidence of such variation would potentially be informative for election survey researchers and consumers. Many pollsters continue to use live telephone
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interviewing with random-digit-dial (RDD) samples of landlines and
cell phones in the United States. Other pollsters conduct their surveys online, typically using opt-in samples of internet users. A third
common approach is interactive voice response (IVR) either alone or
in combination with an online opt-in sample. Nearly all IVR samples
and an increasing number of live telephone samples are being drawn
not from the RDD frames of all telephone numbers but instead from
state-based voter registration files (“registration-based sampling,” or
RBS). While campaign pollsters have been using RBS for some time,
the widespread use of RBS is a fairly recent development in public
polls (Cohn 2014).
The committee examined two main design features for their effects on accuracy: mode of administration (e.g., live phone, internet,
or IVR) and sample source (e.g., RDD, RBS, or opt-in internet users).
These variables were coded for all national preelection surveys and
battleground state surveys conducted in the final 13 days of the general election. The data are summarized in Figure 3. In terms of mode,
national polls were twice as likely to be conducted by live telephone
as battleground state polls (36 versus 18 percent, respectively). Battleground state polls were about twice as likely to be conducted using some form of IVR as national polls (41 versus 18 percent, respectively). The share of polls conducted using the internet was basically
the same for national and state-level polling.
Figure 4 gets to the central question of whether polls with certain
types of designs were more accurate than others. Sample sizes for this
analysis are small, and the effects from mode and sample source are
to some extent confounded with house effects, such as differences in
the likely voter model used. Still, IVR polls tended to exhibit somewhat
less error in the 2016 general election than live telephone or internet
polls. Battleground state polls that just used IVR had an average absolute error of 2.8 percentage points. By contrast, battleground state
polls conducted using RDD with live phone and online opt-in had average errors of 3.8 and 3.9 points, respectively. Among national polls,
none was conducted using just IVR. The national polls conducted by
IVR and supplemented with an online sample had an average absolute error of 1.2 points, as compared with 1.6 for live telephone and
1.5 for online opt-in polls. OLS regression analysis controlling for the
potentially confounding effects from the specific contest polled and
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Figure 3. Design of 2016 general election polls conducted in final 13 days. The Franklin Pierce and Data Orbital polls, which were conducted by live telephone and had
ambiguous statements about sample source that suggested RDD (but were not totally clear), are coded as live phone (RDD).

Figure 4. Average absolute error for 2016 general election polls, by design. Figures
based on polls conducted during the final 13 days. Sample sizes for this analysis are
small, and the effects from mode and sample source are to some extent confounded
with house effects. National poll averages are based on seven polls (IVR+internet),
14 polls (live phone RDD) and 15 polls (internet opt-in). Battleground-state poll averages are based on 29 polls (IVR), 13 (live phone RBS), 34 polls (IVR+internet), 20
polls (IVR+live phone), 25 polls (live phone RDD), and 78 polls (internet opt-in).
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number of days from Election Day corroborated the bivariate finding
that polls using IVR tended to have less error in the 2016 general election (Supplement Appendix B).
The fact that IVR-only polls did relatively well is interesting in light
of federal regulations dictating that IVR can only be used with landline numbers and about half of adults do not have landlines (Blumberg and Luke 2016). This half of the population would not have any
chance of selection in an IVR sample, assuming that cell phone numbers were flagged and purged before the IVR dialing began. Such substantial noncoverage may increase the risk of bias.3
On the other hand, adults who have dropped their landline in favor of a cell phone or never had a landline to begin with tend to be
younger and more racially and ethnically diverse than adults accessible by landline. These cell-only adults are more likely to be Democratic. In the 2016 election, in which turnout among African Americans and younger voters was not particularly high, undercoverage of
cell-phone-only voters appears not to have been a major problem and
may help explain why IVR-only polls performed relatively well. In fact,
when IVR polls were supplemented with an online component to capture cell-phone-only voters, they did slightly worse. Analysis of national polling errors by mode in recent elections (Online Supplement
Appendix B) shows that IVR-only polls fared worse than other modes
in both 2008 and 2012—elections in which Democratic turnout was
relatively high. This suggests that the IVR results in 2016 may be an
election-specific phenomenon related to the particular turnout patterns that year.

Evidence for Theories about Why Polls Underestimated
Trump’s Support
This section focuses on testing the major theories about why many
general election polls underestimated support for Donald Trump.

3. A review of methodological reports for IVR polls found that the commonly held assumption that such polls only dial landlines (Cassino 2016; Clinton and Rogers 2013; Cohn 2014;
Enten 2012; Jackson 2016; Pew Research Center 2016) is not always correct. At least two
pollsters described their methodology as IVR and yet reported that a noticeable share (10
to 25 percent) of their completed interviews were with cell phones.
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Weighting: Education Was Strongly Correlated with Survey
Participation and Presidential Vote
One hypothesis about 2016 polling errors is that pollsters did not interview enough white voters without a college degree (Silver 2016).
Indeed, numerous studies have shown that adults with less formal education tend to be underrepresented in surveys (Battaglia, Frankel,
and Link 2008; Link et al. 2008; Chang and Krosnick 2009; Pew Research Center 2012, 2017a). Generally speaking, this well-established
education skew need not bias estimates. Many pollsters adjust their
samples to population benchmarks for education in order to address
this very issue. As long as the pollster accounts for the underrepresentation of less educated adults in their weighting, this issue would
not lead to bias, so long as the less educated adults they did interview
were representative of the ones they did not interview.
Why would overrepresentation of college graduates have undermined polls in 2016 but not previous elections? The answer is that
in 2016 the presidential vote was strongly and fairly linearly related
to education; the more formal education a voter had, the more likely
they were to vote for Clinton (right-hand panel in Figure 5). Historically, that has not been the case. In other modern US elections, presidential vote (defined here as support for the Democratic candidate)
exhibited a U-shaped or “curvilinear” pattern with respect to education. For example, as shown in the left-hand panel of Figure 5, in
2012 both the least-educated and most-educated voters broke heavily

Figure 5. Democratic presidential vote margin in 2012 and 2016 by voter education
level and geography. Source.—NEP national exit poll (2012, 2016).

Kennedy et al. in Public Opinion Quarterly 82 (2018)

16

for Barack Obama, while those in the middle (with some college or a
bachelor’s degree) split roughly evenly for Mitt Romney and Barack
Obama. Thus, the effects of weighting for education (or not) differ in
2012 versus 2016.
In 2012, the postgraduate voters who are likely to be overrepresented in polls that are not adjusted for education voted in much the
same way as the low-education voters that such polls underrepresent. By contrast, in 2016, highly educated voters were poor proxies
for the voters at the lowest education levels nationally and in the pivotal states in the Upper Midwest.
Following the election, two different state-level pollsters who had
not adjusted for education in their preelection estimates reweighted
their data to account for education. Both pollsters found that adjusting
for education meaningfully improved their polls’ accuracy by reducing
estimates of Clinton support. The final University of New Hampshire
(UNH) poll had Clinton leading by 11 points. She ultimately won by a
razor-thin 0.4-point margin. According to UNH poll director Andrew
Smith (in email correspondence): “We have not weighted by level of
education in our election polling in the past and we have consistently
been the most accurate poll in NH (it hasn’t made any difference and
I prefer to use as few weights as possible), but we think it was a major factor this year. When we include a weight for level of education,
our predictions match the final number.” Indeed, as shown in Figure
6, had the UNH poll adjusted for education in 2016, that single modification would have removed essentially all of the error. The education-adjusted estimates showed a tied race.
The story is similar, though less dramatic, for Michigan State University’s (MSU) State of the State Poll. That poll, which like the UNH
poll was conducted via live phone with a dual-frame RDD sample,
showed Clinton leading Trump in Michigan by 17 points.4 She ultimately lost that contest by a slim margin (0.2 points). The MSU poll
did not adjust for education, but if it had, Clinton’s estimated lead
would have been 10 points instead of 17. One other noteworthy feature
of the MSU poll is that unlike the UNH poll, it was fielded relatively
4. An early release of the MSU poll reported a 20-point Clinton lead (http://msutoday.msu.
edu/_/pdf/assets/2016/state-of-state-survey.pdf). The corresponding microdataset provided to the committee, presumably reflecting the final release, gives a 17-point Clinton
lead, as shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. Poll estimates with and without weighting adjustment for education, relative to 2016 presidential vote outcome. Source.—University of New Hampshire poll
conducted November 3–6, 2016, with 707 likely voters. Michigan State University
poll conducted September 1–October 30, 2016, with 743 likely voters.

early, with most interviews completed before mid-October. Thus, the
MSU poll largely missed what appears to be a significant, late shift in
support to Trump (Blake 2016). As discussed below, the national exit
poll indicates that about 13 percent of Michigan voters made their
presidential vote choice in the final week of the campaign, and that
group went for Trump by about an 11-point margin.
To better understand the scope of this issue, the committee investigated how many polls in key races did or did not adjust for respondent education in their weighting. This effort required manual investigation and coding of each poll, so it was performed on a subset of the
state contests (FL, OH, MI, NC, PA, WI) in addition to national polls.
Only polls conducted in the final two weeks and only each pollster’s
final poll (to avoid double-counting pollsters who fielded more than
one poll in the final weeks) were considered.5
5. This yielded an analytic dataset with 102 polls. Despite outreach efforts to individual pollsters, we were unable to determine whether 17 of these polls had adjusted on education.
Most of these undetermined polls (15 of the 17) featured at least some IVR and at least some
voter file sample. Virtually all polls of this type that did disclose their weighting variables
did not adjust on education. We therefore felt reasonably comfortable assuming that polls
with missing weighting information did not adjust for education. This imputation rule may
be incorrect for a handful of polls, but based on the data that are present, it is highly unlikely that the imputation rule is wrong for a meaningful number of polls in this analysis.
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Table 2. Share of pollsters that adjusted on education in weighting
Type of poll
Michigan polls
Wisconsin polls
North Carolina polls
Florida polls
Pennsylvania polls
Ohio polls
National polls

Share of polls that
weighted for education

Number of
final polls

18%
27%
29%
31%
33%
36%
52%

11
11
14
16
18
11
21

Figures reflect only polls fielded in the final two weeks and only a given pollster’s final poll.
The requisite weighting information was missing for 23 polls, which were all imputed as not
weighting on education, based on information among similar polls that did disclose their
weighting variables.

Table 2 shows that most state-level polls did not adjust for education in weighting, whereas about half of national polls did. In Michigan, under one-fifth of polls adjusted for education, while in Ohio just
over one-third (36 percent) did so. The polls in other decisive states
fell somewhere in between.
One contributor to this lack of accounting for education in weighting adjustments is that in 2016 the modal state-level poll was an IVR
poll that drew its sample from a voter file and may or may not have
fielded a supplemental opt-in online sample. Voter file samples provide pollsters with useful information about the poll respondents and
nonrespondents. This information, which is frequently used in weighting adjustments, includes voter age, gender, geography, party registration, past voting history and, for some states, race. Some polls also
adjust their weights with modeled data for the likelihood of voting.
Education, however, is not on the voter file and is generally absent
from the weighting protocols of polls sampling off the voter file. Pollsters who sample from the voter file could adjust for education using
some other source, such as the Current Population Survey, but most
of them did not do so.
It appears that a number of IVR pollsters who sampled from voter
files did not even measure respondent education. Table 3 shows that
in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin only about half of the IVR
pollsters were measuring respondent education, based on their press
releases (which show gender, race, and other demographics).
We use the CPS Voting and Registration Supplement as benchmark
data for the demographic profile of the voting electorate in 2016. The
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Table 3. Share of college graduates in interactive voice response polls relative to the Current
Population Survey in three states
Michigan
CPS benchmark
Gravis
Emerson College
Mitchell Research
Trafalgar Group
EPIC/MRA
PPP

Pennsylvania
38%
53%
48%
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

CPS benchmark
Gravis
Emerson College
Harper
Trafalgar Group
PPP

Wisconsin
36%
57%
54%
54%
N/A
N/A

CPS benchmark
Emerson
Mitchell
Trafalgar
PPP

37%
48%
N/A
N/A
N/A

Benchmark data are weighted, filtered on self-reported voters, and come from the November 2016 Current Population Survey Voting and Registration Supplement. Election poll data
come from pollster press releases and appear to be weighted. “N/A” indicates that respondent education level does not appear to have been measured in the poll.

comparison shows that IVR polls overrepresented college graduates by
at least 10 percentage points in critical Upper Midwest states (Table
3). Given that higher education levels were strongly associated with
support for Clinton, the overrepresentation of more highly educated
voters and not accounting for education in weighting contributed to
errors in these states.
Did Polls Underrepresent Staunchly Pro-Trump Areas?
One question raised by the analysis above is whether the education
imbalance was the only prevalent nonresponse bias in 2016 polls—or
were there more? Nonresponse bias is notoriously hard to test, but
one ecological analysis was possible. This analysis leveraged information about which parts of the country were staunchly pro-Trump and
how many people live in those areas versus the rest of the country. If
polls systematically failed to interview people in staunchly pro-Trump
areas, we would expect to find residents of such counties underrepresented in polls. For example, if the Census shows that 13 percent of
Americans live in staunchly pro-Trump areas, but polls estimate that
only 9 percent of Americans live in those same areas, that would be
evidence that polls were, indeed, systematically missing Trump supporters. However, there was no evidence to that effect. The results are
presented in Table 4.
Since there was no obvious, definitive way to define a “staunchly
pro- Trump” area, three definitions were tested. The definition used
in the first row of the table identifies counties in which Trump won

Kennedy et al. in Public Opinion Quarterly 82 (2018)

20

Table 4. Estimates of the share of US adults living in staunchly pro-Trump counties
Share of the US population living in those areas
CNN/ORC poll
Three definitions of staunchly
pro-Trump areas
Counties Trump won by 40+ points
Counties Trump won by 60+ points
Rural counties (< 50 people/mi2)

Number
of counties

Census
Benchmark

1,486
524
1,657

13%
3%
9%

Pew Research poll

Weighted Unweighted
estimate
estimate
16%
4%
12%

16%
4%
12%

Weighted Unweighted
estimate
estimate
13%
3%
9%

13%
3%
10%

The Census figures are based on people of all ages. Census figures are 2015 population estimates. CNN/ORC estimates based
on 1,017 interviews conducted October 20–23, 2016. Pew data are based on a cumulated file with all 15,812 interviews conducted in routine dual-frame RDD surveys in 2016. The CNN/ORC and Pew figures are based on people age 18 or older.

by at least a 40-point margin. The definition used in the second row
identifies counties in which Trump won by at least a 60-point margin. Finally, the third row simply identifies rural counties, defined as
those with a population density of fewer than 50 people per square
mile. The rural definition was motivated by the fact that Trump,
like most Republican presidential candidates, generally had much
stronger support in rural areas than metropolitan areas. Census estimates for the share of the population living in areas identified using each of these three definitions come from the 2015 Census population estimates. Poll estimates come from two microdatasets that
contained the requisite county-level information—the mid- October
CNN/ORC poll (n = 1,017) and a cumulative dataset with all 15,812
telephone interviews that Pew Research Center conducted in 2016
political polling.6
If the polls systematically missed people in staunchly pro-Trump
areas, then the figures in the unweighted estimate columns would be
noticeably lower than the Census benchmarks in the second column.
If such a pattern was not fixed by the weighting, then the estimates in
6. As stated in the footnote of Table 4, the Census figures are based on all ages and the CNN/
ORC and Pew Research Center figures are based on all adults age 18 or older. Analyses indicated that the discrepancy did not confound the comparison in a noticeable way. While it
seemed possible that rural and other staunchly pro-Trump areas skew slightly older than
other parts of the country, there was no empirical evidence of that. For example, the predominantly rural and overwhelmingly pro-Trump states of Oklahoma and Wyoming represented equal shares of the entire US population (1.2 and 0.2 percent, respectively) and
the US adult population (also 1.2 and 0.2 percent, respectively). Consequently, this small
discrepancy has no meaningful impact on the results or conclusions in this analysis.
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the weighted estimate columns would also be noticeably lower than
the Census benchmarks. Neither of those patterns is present in the
data. If anything, people living in the most pro-Trump parts of the
country are slightly overrepresented.
These findings do not rule out the possibility that differential nonresponse was a factor in 2016. It is possible that the people interviewed in these pro- Trump areas were not representative with respect to their vote choice. It is also important to note that this analysis,
based on telephone RDD polling data, may not generalize to online optin polls or IVR polls. Even with these caveats, it is informative that
this particular test, which we expected might detect underrepresentation of pro-Trump areas, does not show evidence of bias.
Likely Voter Modeling
The 2012 voting electorate was not a particularly good model for the
2016 voting electorate in key states. While the change in turnout may
explain some of the polling error in 2016, just how much is difficult
to quantify. Some pollsters lean heavily on the assumption that the
past election is the best possible model of the coming election, but
others do not (Supplement Appendix D discusses various approaches
to likely voter modeling).
One straightforward way to evaluate how well a poll predicted
turnout is to validate which respondents voted and which did not.
Such an exercise can shed light on how accurately the pollster’s methods identified likely voters, and on whether either nonvoters included
in the sample or actual voters left out contributed to any error in estimating the ultimate result. Unfortunately, a full validation is neither
easy nor feasible for the vast majority of public polls. Polls conducted
by telephone rarely attempt to ask and record the full name and street
address of every respondent—the information necessary to attempt
anything approaching a complete match to official records. Practically speaking, the surveys most able to validate turnout are those that
sampled directly from voter lists and interviewed specific voters, by
name, allowing for a full match to voter file data. In such instances,
the match back to vote history records is relatively straightforward,
once the voter files have been updated to include 2016 turnout data.
Very few surveys whose results were made public in 2016 sampled from voter lists in a way that readily facilitates validation. One
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Figure 7. Signed error on 2016 presidential vote margin by poll, level of modeling,
and state. The Marquette University poll was fielded October 27–30, 2016. The SurveyMonkey polls were all fielded November 1–7, 2016. The Monmouth University
polls were fielded October 15–18, 2016 (Wisconsin), October 20–23, 2016 (North
Carolina), and October 29–November 1, 2016 (Pennsylvania). The CNN/ORC polls
were fielded October 10–15, 2016 (North Carolina), and October 27–November 1,
2016 (Pennsylvania and Florida).

example involves a series of polls conducted for the College of William
and Mary by Target Smart, a Democratic-aligned data firm. A postelection analysis found that their respondents who actually voted were
more likely to support Trump than respondents who did not vote. Excluding the validated nonvoters moved their estimate of Trump’s percentage of the two-party (Trump and Clinton) vote in Ohio from 51 to
53 percent. Trump received 54 percent of the two-party vote in that
state. Another way to assess the effect of likely voter modeling on accuracy is with microdata.
One possible scenario is that the raw data collected by pollsters in
key battleground states was relatively accurate, but well-intentioned
demographic adjustments or likely voter modeling led the polls astray.
Figure 7 shows the signed error on the presidential vote margin for
polls in four key battleground states. For each poll, the weighted likely
voter (LV) estimate is shown in black, the weighted registered voter
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(RV) estimate is shown in gray, and the unweighted RV estimate is
shown in white.7 The higher the value, the more the estimate overstated support for Clinton, relative to the election outcome. It is important to note that several of the polls included in the analysis were
fielded more than two weeks out from Election Day and were not intended to be a final projection of the contest.
The results point to inconsistent effects from weighting and likely
voter modeling across polls. In the SurveyMonkey polls, conducted online with op-tin sample, the weighting clearly helped improve accuracy. The likely voter model, however, tended to have little effect on
SurveyMonkey’s estimates for the states examined. The pattern for
CNN/ORC polls, conducted by live telephone with RDD sample, was
quite different. CNN/ORC’s unweighted data was basically spot on
the margin in Florida and quite close in Pennsylvania. In those states,
weighting and likely voter modeling increased the signed error by several percentage points, making the final figures too Democratic. NonHispanic blacks constituted 10 percent of CNN/ORC’s unweighted RV
sample in Florida but 14 percent of the weighted LV sample. Since the
poll had blacks favoring Clinton by 92 points, that adjustment (which
probably would have improved accuracy in an election with higher
Democratic turnout) had the net effect of pushing the published margin farther from the vote outcome. The CNN/ORC data in Pennsylvania tell the same story. In North Carolina, by contrast, likely voter
modeling improved the CNN/ORC poll.
In Wisconsin, statistically adjusting the data slightly helped the
Marquette University poll and slightly hurt the Monmouth University poll. In both cases, additional analysis revealed that the weighting and/or likely voter modeling had virtually no effect on the race
distribution. The Marquette poll weighting, however, noticeably reduced the influence of college graduates (by 12 percentage points),
while the Monmouth weighting did not.
This analysis demonstrates that different pollsters made different assumptions about the education and race/ethnicity profile of
the voting electorate in 2016. In these battleground states, weighting
down college graduates helped improve accuracy while weighting up
non-Hispanic blacks appears to have reduced accuracy. This result
7. The Monmouth microdatasets did not have a variable to distinguish LVs from all RVs, so
no weighted RV estimates are presented for those polls.
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comports with reporting of turnout patterns in the election. Overall, the analysis shows that postsurvey statistical adjustment reduced
error in these polls, and more specifically reduced overestimation of
Clinton support—by about two percentage points. Unfortunately, the
adjustment did not succeed in reducing the error to zero, but the direction of the effect indicates that pollsters were conscious of the fact
that their data needed adjustment and they were, in most cases, making the adjustments in the proper direction. Thus, statistical adjustment, in itself, does not appear to be an important cause of error in
the polls broadly speaking.
Late Deciding: Evidence from National Exit Poll Data
If voters who told pollsters in September or October that they were
undecided or considering a third-party candidate ultimately voted for
Trump by a large margin, that would explain at least some of the discrepancy between the polls and the election outcome. There is evidence that this happened in key battleground states and, to a lesser
extent, at the national level. As reported by Blake (2016), the National
Election Pool (NEP) exit poll conducted by Edison Research showed
a substantial advantage for Trump among voters deciding their presidential choice in the final week of the campaign, particularly in the
four states Clinton lost by the smallest margins. In Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Florida, 11 to 15 percent of voters said that
they finally decided for whom to vote in the presidential election in
the last week. According to the exit poll, these voters broke for Trump
by nearly 30 points in Wisconsin, by 17 points in Pennsylvania and
Florida, and by 11 points in Michigan. If late deciders had split evenly
in these states, the exit poll data suggest that Clinton may have won
both Florida and Wisconsin, although probably not Michigan or Pennsylvania, where Trump either won or tied among those deciding before the final week. The pattern was not as strong nationally. The results are presented in Table 5.
These results suggest that many polls were probably fairly accurate
at the time they were conducted. Clinton may very well have been tied,
if not ahead, in at least three of these states roughly a week to two
weeks out from Election Day. In that event, what was wrong with the
polls was projection error (their ability to predict what would happen
days or weeks later on November 8), not a fundamental problem with
their ability to measure public opinion at a given moment.
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Table 5. Time of decision and presidential vote in key states won by Trump
		
Vote choice 		
Vote choice
% Voters
among voters
among voters 		
who decided
deciding in final week
deciding earlier		
in final						
week
Trump
Clinton
Trump
Clinton
Florida
Michigan
Pennsylvania
Wisconsin
National

11%
13%
15%
14%
13%

55%
50%
54%
59%
45%

38%
39%
37%
30%
42%

48%
48%
50%
47%
46%

49%
48%
48%
49%
49%

Estimated
Trump gain
from late
deciders

Election
(% Trump –
% Clinton)

2.0%
1.4%
2.3%
4.3%
0.8%

1.2%
0.2%
1.2%
0.8%
–2.1%

Analysis from Blake (2016) using NEP exit poll data.

Late Deciding: Evidence from a Callback Study
One limitation of the exit poll data is that they rely on people’s recall
about when they made a decision, which is prone to measurement
error. A callback design, such as that employed in the Pew Research
Center’s callback telephone study, can also be informative about late
decision-making, while avoiding reliance on recall. The Pew study
re-contacted registered voters in Pew’s August and October national
cross-sectional dual-frame RDD surveys. The re-interview was conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates International from
November 10 to 14, 2016. Only respondents who self-reported having voted were eligible to complete the postelection re-interview (n
= 1,254).
In the callback study data, changes in vote preference manifest
as discrepancies between pre- and postelection responses. It is also
possible that Shy Trump responding would manifest the same way.
Some respondents might have been inclined to censor their support
for Trump before the election, but in light of his victory decide to be
forthcoming about their vote for him in the postelection interview.
If poll respondents said they were undecided before the election and
then said in November that they voted for Trump, the explanation
could be either that they truly were undecided preelection or that they
intentionally misreported as undecided. For some voters, the truth
may fall somewhere in between.
The cross-tabulation of callback respondents’ preelection and postelection responses is shown in Table 6. Cases on the downward, leftto-right diagonal represent respondents who answered the presidential
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Table 6. Comparing individuals’ pre- and postelection responses to presidential vote
Reported vote
Preelection vote
preference

Voted for
Clinton

Voted for
Trump

Voted for other
candidate

Don’t know
or refused

Clinton/Lean Clinton
44.2%
0.4%
1.2%
Trump/Lean Trump
0.3%
38.2%
0.3%
Other candidate
1.6%
2.6%
6.3%
Don’t know or refused to lean
0.7%
1.4%
0.4%
				

0.6%
1.1%
0.2%
0.6%

100%

Source: Pew Research Center 2016 Election Callback Study. Based on 1,254 completed re-interviews
with survey respondents who said they voted in the general election. Estimates are unweighted.

vote question the same way before and after the election. About nine in
10 respondents (89 percent) answered consistently, while 11 percent reported doing something different at the ballot box than what they told
the pollster before the election. In the context of recent elections, that
11 percent is quite typical. Pew Research Center has been conducting
callback studies since 2000. Over the past five cycles, 12 percent of respondents, on average, gave different pre- versus postelection responses
(a result highly similar to Durand, Blais, and Vachon [2001]).
What is notable about the 2016 data is how the inconsistent responders voted. Figure 8 shows the presidential vote margin among
respondents who gave inconsistent pre- versus postelection responses
in callback studies since 2000. Typically, those who admit changing
their minds break about evenly between the Republican candidate
and the Democratic candidate. In 2016, by contrast, inconsistent responders in the Pew study voted for Trump by a 16-point margin. That
is more than double the second largest margin in the time series (+7
points for George W. Bush in 2000).
The net effect on an election estimate based on such a preelection
poll would be an error of just under two percentage points in underestimating support for Trump. Clinton’s estimated national popular
vote lead based on the registered voters in this study before the election was six percentage points, and her national lead based on those
same individuals’ post-election responses was four points. In addition, a small percentage of those screened for the postelection callback survey reported not voting (about 8 percent, n = 104). Clinton led
Trump 44 to 27 percent among those who reported not voting. Thus,
nonvoting hurt Clinton slightly more than it hurt Trump among this
small sample.

Kennedy et al. in Public Opinion Quarterly 82 (2018)

27

Figure 8. Vote margin (% voted for Republican candidate – % voted for Democratic
candidate) among callback respondents giving inconsistent pre- vs. postelection responses. Data are from Pew Research Center RDD callback studies.

“Shy Trump” Reporting: Comparing Self- Versus
Interviewer-Administered Modes
Is there evidence for the Shy Trump theory? If there was indeed a
strong social desirability bias against expressing support for Trump,
interviewer-administered polls (e.g., live phone) should record lower
levels of Trump support than self-administered polls (e.g., IVR or online). For this test, all published polls conducted from September 1
to Election Day were examined. Figure 9 shows the national trend in
Trump support, by mode, using a local regression estimation. It illustrates that estimates produced by live telephone polls were similar to
those produced by self-administered online polls.
However, these aggregate effects may be due to other features of
the polls than just mode of administration. To better isolate an effect
from a mode, a regression analysis was conducted that controlled for
length of field period, tracking poll versus nontracking poll, likely
voter (LV) versus registered voter (RV) estimate, and change over
time (Supplement Appendix E). The results show that self-administered online polls and interviewer-administered phone polls both recorded lower levels of support for Trump than IVR polls.
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Figure 9. Support for Trump (on the sum of the two major party candidates) by
mode. Each point represents a poll estimate positioned at the midpoint of the field
period. Lines represent Loess estimates of change over time using Epanechnikov .65
estimation. IVR refers to interactive voice response. © C. Durand, 2016.

The finding that live telephone surveys did not consistently underestimate Trump’s support more than self-administered online polls is
informative, though not conclusive, evidence against the Shy Trump
hypothesis. Live telephone polls and self-administered polls differ by
too many important factors (e.g., sample source, weighting) for this
type of analysis to cleanly isolate the effect from interviewer presence,
even when using statistical modeling. That said, this analysis offers
no compelling evidence for the Shy Trump theory.
“Shy Trump” Reporting: Experiments Testing the Effect of Mode
on Trump Support
In 2016, one polling organization, Morning Consult, conducted two
experiments designed to isolate the effect of self- versus interviewer
administration (Dropp 2016) on support for Trump. While the first experiment was conducted in the run-up to the primaries and the second
during the general election, they used the same basic design. A group
of likely voters was recruited from an online opt-in sample source and
asked a set of background questions. They were then randomly assigned to complete the remainder of the interview by either proceeding with an online survey or dialing into a call center and answering
questions from a live interviewer. The general election edition of the
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experiment yielded a mode difference in the expected direction (Clinton +5 points in the live phone condition versus +3 points in the web
condition), but the result was not statistically significant. Dropp did
report a statistically significant mode effect in the expected direction
(more Trump support in the online condition than the live telephone
condition) among well-educated and higher-income voters.
More recently, Pew Research Center (2017b) conducted an experiment that randomized mode of interview on the Center’s American
Trends Panel, which is recruited from national landline and cell phone
RDD surveys. Half of the panelists were assigned to take the survey
online, and the other half via a live phone interview. That study, conducted February 28–March 12, 2017, found little evidence that poll
participants were censoring support for Trump when speaking to an
interviewer. There was no significant difference by mode of interview on any of four questions asking directly about Trump (e.g., presidential job approval, personal favorability). Questions asking about
major policy priorities of the Trump Administration also showed no
mode effect, except on treatment of undocumented immigrants, which
showed eight percentage points more support for the conservative position online relative to on the phone. Taken together, these experiments suggest that there may have been some self-censoring of support for Trump in preelection polls, but the effect was likely to have
been relatively small in size.
“Shy Trump” Reporting: Trump’s Performance Relative to
Republican Senate Candidates
A different way to test the Shy Trump hypothesis is to compare
Trump’s performance in state-level polls to the performance of Republican candidates for Senate in those same polls. Presumably, respondents who may have felt pressure to censor their support for
Trump did not feel similar pressure to censor support for the Republican Senate candidate. If such differential censoring did occur, then
at the individual-poll level, Trump should outperform his poll number
by a larger margin than the Republican Senate candidate did.
Testing this theory involved using battleground-state polls conducted entirely within the final two weeks of the election. To be included, each poll needed to measure both Senate and presidential
vote preference. Of the 34 Senate contests in 2016, eight were held in
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states where the presidential vote margin was less than five percentage points (AZ, CO, FL, NH, NV, NC, PA, WI). The analytic dataset of
66 polls included the final polls for these eight states and, for each
state, only the last poll conducted by each firm. Overperformance is
defined as the signed difference between the final vote margin and
the poll margin, where the margin is the Republican vote minus the
Democratic vote.8,9 The central question is whether Trump tended to
outperform his poll numbers more than a Republican Senate candidate in the same poll, particularly for live telephone polls. As shown
in the first row of Table 7, no support exists for that hypothesis. In
the 24 live telephone polls analyzed, Trump beat his poll estimate by
1.4 percentage points on average, and the Republican Senate candidate beat his or her poll estimate by a nearly identical 1.3 percentage
points on average. A similar, independent analysis reached the same
general conclusion (Enten 2016).
In fact, not only did Trump outperform poll estimates, so did most
Republican candidates in competitive Senate and House races. This
pattern is evidenced by the fact that all of the values in the first two
columns are positive. This finding is suggestive of systematic underestimation not just of support for Trump but of Republican candidates
more generally. Indeed, Republican candidates for the US House of
Representatives also tended to outperform their poll numbers. Nationally, the actual congressional vote was +1.1 for Republicans, whereas
the final polling average from RealClearPolitics was estimated at +0.6
for Democrats. The fact that polls tended to underestimate support
for Republican candidates writ large in 2016 suggests that polling errors were not caused by socially desirable reporting.

8. For example, consider a Wisconsin poll showing the Senate race margin at –1 (44 percent
for Johnson, the Republican, and 45 percent for Feingold, the Democrat) and the presidential margin at –6 (38 percent for Trump and 44 percent for Clinton). The actual elections
in Wisconsin went +3.4 for Johnson and +0.7 for Trump. In this analysis, Johnson overperformed that poll by 3.4 – (–1) = +4.4 points, and Trump overperformed by 0.7 – (–6)
= +6.7 points. Comparatively speaking, Trump overperformed the poll by 6.7 – 4.4 = 2.3
points more than the Republican Senate candidate did.
9. “Overperformance” also can be defined with respect to the candidate’s estimated share of
the total vote, as opposed to using the Republican-Democrat margin as described in the
text. However, vote share was not a suitable framework. Due to the fact that polls feature undecided voters and tended to overestimate support for third-party candidates, both
Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton generally “overperformed” relative to their estimated
vote share in polls.
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Table 7. Trump’s overperformance of polls relative to Republican Senate candidates in battleground states
Average overperformance
(Vote margin – Poll margin)
			
Senate
President
Rep.
Rep.
Type of poll
candidate
candidate
Live phone
Online
Interactive voice response
(alone or with online sample)
Other

Avg.
difference
(Pres. error –
Sen. error)

Polls

1.3%
4.5%
2.7%

1.4%
3.2%
1.8%

0.0%
–1.3%
–0.9%

24
17
22

7.7%

3.9%

–3.8%

3

“Shy Trump” Reporting: Effects of Interviewer Characteristics
on Vote Preference
Another indirect test for socially desirable reporting is to look at
whether responses to the vote preference question varied by potentially discernable interviewer characteristics, such as gender and race.
For example, if poll respondents interviewed by white males were significantly more likely to report intending to vote for Trump than those
with female and/or non-white interviewers, then misreporting was
a problem. It is possible that some respondents who knew they were
Trump voters were reluctant to say so, even to white male interviewers, so this is an imperfect test.
Two microdatasets made available to the committee contained variables for interviewer race and gender, the ABC News/Washington Post
poll and Pew Research Center’s October poll. Because survey respondents are not randomly assigned to interviewers, statistical models
are required to estimate the effects of interviewer race and sex on respondent vote preferences. In multivariate modeling controlling for
basic respondent demographics (gender, race/ethnicity, education),
there was no residual effect from interviewer race or gender on vote
preference (Supplement Appendix F). The lack of evidence for an effect from interviewer characteristics on how respondents answered
the presidential vote question is inconsistent with expectations of the
Shy Trump theory, though it is not dispositive in ruling it out.
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Conclusions
The committee, commissioned by AAPOR, conducted an extensive investigation of the performance of preelection polls in 2016. While the
general public reaction was that the polls failed, we found the reality
to be more complex. Some polls, indeed, had large problematic errors,
but many polls did not. In particular, the national polls were generally
correct (with respect to the popular vote) and accurate by historical
standards. The accuracy of primary polls was typical of recent elections. The most glaring problems occurred in state-level general election polling, particularly in the Upper Midwest.
The committee evaluated a number of different theories as to why
so many polls underestimated support for Donald Trump. The explanations for which the most evidence exists are a late swing in vote
preference toward Trump and a pervasive failure to adjust for overrepresentation of college graduates (who favored Clinton). In addition,
there is clear evidence that voter turnout changed from 2012 to 2016
in ways that favored Trump and other Republicans, though there is
only mixed evidence that misspecified likely voter models were a major cause of the systematic polling error. Despite widespread speculation, there is little evidence that socially desirable (Shy Trump) responding was a major contributor to poll error. Experimental studies
suggest that such mismeasurement error may have contributed errors on the order of a percentage point or two, but several other tests
of this theory found no effect. If there was a Shy Trump effect on responses, it does not appear to have been particularly large.
One encouraging result from the historical analysis is that there is
no systematic bias toward one major party or the other in US polling.
In 2016, national and state-level polls tended to underestimate support for Trump, the Republican nominee. In 2012 and 2000, however,
general election polls clearly tended to underestimate support for the
Democratic presidential candidates. The trend lines for both national
polls and state-level polls show that for any given election, whether
the polls tend to miss in the Republican direction or the Democratic
direction is essentially random.
One broader question raised by this investigation is whether the
polling problems in 2016 could reoccur. At a high level, the 2016 election featured a number of unusual circumstances that are perhaps
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unlikely to repeat (e.g., both major party candidates being historically unpopular, split outcomes in the popular vote and Electoral College, nearly 14 million votes across three states breaking for a candidate by about one-half of one percentage point), but several structural
weaknesses of polls are likely to persist. Errors in state polls like those
observed in 2016 are not uncommon, even though 2016 was a particularly bad election for state polls. With shrinking budgets at news
outlets to finance polling, there is no reason to believe that the quality of state polling is going to noticeably improve in the near future.
Finally, a late swing in favor of one candidate (as appears to have occurred in 2016) is not something that pollsters can necessarily guard
against, other than by fielding closer to Election Day.
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